Several European countries have decided to phase out coal power generation. Emissions from electricity generation are already regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and in some countries like Germany the phaseout of coal will be accompanied with cancellation of emissions allowances. In this paper we examine the consequences of phasing out coal, both for the broader economy, the electricity sector, and for CO2 emissions. We show analytically how the welfare impacts for a phaseout region depend on i) whether and how allowances are canceled, ii) whether other countries join phaseout policies, and iii) terms-of-trade effects in the ETS market. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model for the European economy, we quantify the economic and environmental impacts of alternative phaseout scenarios, considering both unilateral and multilateral phaseout. We find that terms-oftrade effects in the ETS market play an important role for the welfare effects across EU member states. For Germany, coal phaseout combined with unilateral cancellation of allowances is found to be welfare-improving if the German citizens value emissions reductions at 65 Euro per ton or more.
Oldenburg discussion papers in economics
Oldenburg discussion papers in economics ; V-430-20 (July 2020)
Several EU member states are exploring options for setting minimum domestic carbon prices within the EU Emission Trading System (ETS). First, a "TAX" policy would introduce a carbon tax equal to the difference between the prevailing ETS price and the targeted minimum price. Second, a national auction reserve price would "KILL" allowances by invalidating them until the ETS price equalled the national minimum price. Third, a government could require domestic overcompliance and "BILL" covered entities for extra allowances per ton of emissions, thereby increasing demand for allowances and pulling up the ETS price. We explore the implications of these policy options on national and ETS-wide carbon prices, revenues from emissions allowances, emissions, and economic welfare. We find that a national government's preferred unilateral policy will depend on the extent to which it values the fiscal benefits of revenues, which favor TAX or to a lesser degree BILL, versus climate benefits, which favor KILL and also BILL, particularly for jurisdictions with more emissions to leverage for overcompliance. Our analysis can be generalized to other multilateral cap-and-trade systems where participants pursue more stringent internal emission pricing through unilateral policies.
Oldenburg discussion papers in economics
Oldenburg discussion papers in economics ; V-432-20
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